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Notes
Return to “Reasonable” in Section 1983 Police
Pursuit Excessive Force Litigation
Benjamin Buchwalter*
Scott v. Harris set the standard that a police officer’s use of deadly force to terminate a

high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable, even if it is likely to kill or seriously
injure the suspect. The implications of this are troubling: twenty-eight percent of people
killed in police pursuits each year are innocent bystanders, and vehicle accidents are the
most common cause of police deaths. Scott was wrongly decided because it departed
from the case-by-case reasonableness standard upon which the Supreme Court
previously relied for excessive force cases, failed to consider the potential risk that these
chases added to the public, and did not contemplate safe alternative means of punishing
suspects.
Despite the dangers of Scott’s presumptive reasonableness standard, reversal is not
likely. This was emphasized by the Supreme Court’s 2014 Plumhoff v. Rickard decision,
in which the Court reaffirmed—by a nine-to-zero margin—that use of deadly force to
terminate a high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable. Accordingly, this Note
argues that federal courts should consider state and local excessive force guidelines to
determine what is “reasonable” and what violates “clearly established law.” This Note
also presents guideline excessive force policies that are tailored to urban and rural
areas. These policies take into account the danger that police chases add to the public
and set forth means that are available to apprehend suspects safely at a later time, while
understanding the duty of police officers to ensure that potentially violent criminals are
apprehended quickly.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Haverford College. Thank
you to Professor Aaron Rappaport for his mentorship during the process of writing this Note. Thanks
also to Katelyn Keegan, Emily Goldberg Knox, Nicole Teixeira, Elliot Hosman, and Andrew Ohlert
for their insightful contributions. I would like to acknowledge the entire staff of the Hastings Law
Journal, particularly the executive board and Executive Production Editor Margot Stevens, for their
outstanding work on this Volume. I am eternally grateful for the support of my parents Lisa and
Charlie Buchwalter. This Note is dedicated to Deirdre.
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Introduction
On December 14, 2013, a shooting suspect fled from police officers
and slammed into Stacy Garcia Gray’s car, killing the mother of three.1
Two days later, Edward Gaerlan was severely injured when another
suspect—also attempting to flee from the police—struck his Jeep, causing
it to flip over.2 This pursuit began when officers received a report that the
suspect had a knife in a Target store.3 A bystander who witnessed the
incident highlighted the avoidable nature of this accident: “I don’t think
necessarily if somebody has a knife that that has to be a high-speed chase
where you’re putting lots and lots of lives in danger.”4 These incidents
rounded out a set of four high-speed police chases near Los Angeles that
killed five people and hospitalized a half dozen more in only four days.5
High-speed police chases create a significant danger for innocent
bystanders, whether they occur in cities, towns, or rural areas. In their
portrayal of police pursuits, films, television shows, and television news
programs often assume that this risk is necessary for the police to catch
and apprehend dangerous criminals. However, such pursuits have

1. Elex Michaelson, Police Chase Policies Questioned After Four Deaths, KABC Los Angeles
(Dec. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/los_angeles&id=9362857.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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dangerous consequences: twenty-eight percent of those killed in highspeed police chases in 2007 were innocent civilians,6 and vehicle
accidents are the most common cause of police deaths, accounting for
forty percent between 1987 and 2006.7 The deaths of these officers and
innocent bystanders should be prevented at all reasonable costs.
These unnecessary deaths raise a question central to the Supreme
Court’s nearly three-decade struggle with deadly force litigation: When,
in the interest of public safety, are police officers better off temporarily
letting a suspect go in order to avoid unnecessarily risking the lives of
innocent bystanders, police officers, and the suspects themselves? The
Supreme Court addressed this question when it reviewed the use of
deadly force to terminate high-speed car chases in Scott v. Harris.8
Scott involved a police pursuit that began when an officer clocked
Harris driving seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour
zone.9 After Harris initiated a high-speed pursuit, Officer Scott used a
ramming technique to terminate the pursuit by pushing Harris’ car off the
road, but the car flipped over and caused injuries that left Harris
paralyzed.10 In a departure from precedent,11 the Supreme Court held that
Officer Scott’s use of deadly force was presumptively reasonable because
no reasonable jury could find that the chase lacked the inherent danger to
justify such force.12 To make this determination, the Court focused on the
relative culpability of each party in beginning the pursuit, and barely
considered the danger that the pursuit itself could have added to the
public.13
In a lively dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the officer’s decision to
pursue Harris may have increased the danger to the public, and that the
public might have been better served if the police had temporarily
suspended the pursuit and apprehended Harris later.14 Justice Stevens’
concerns did not persuade the eight-to-one Court, and in its 2014 Plumhoff
v. Rickard decision, the Court reaffirmed that use of deadly force to

6. Fatalities in Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit, NCSA
Information Services Team 51–52 (2008), available at http://www.pursuitsafety.org/images/
PURSUIT_A%
201982-2007.PDF [hereinafter Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit].
7. See Cynthia Lum & George Fachner, Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and
Reform, International Association of Chiefs of Police 7 (2008) (“By far, vehicle-related incidents
are the most likely cause of on-duty police deaths, the largest proportion of which are accidents.”).
8. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
9. Id. at 374.
10. Id. at 375.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. Scott, 550 U.S. at 384, 386.
13. Id. at 384.
14. Id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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terminate a high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable, almost
regardless of the facts of the individual case.15
Scott has become a casebook example of the Court’s standard for
summary judgment and interlocutory review. It is perhaps more
significant, however, because it changed the rules for police officer liability
for use of excessive force following high-speed chases in litigation brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 enables individuals to sue state actors
in state or federal court for violations of federal constitutional rights.16 The
Supreme Court has held that unreasonable use of deadly force constitutes
an “unmatched” violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures.17 Until Scott, use of deadly force was
only permitted in limited circumstances determined on a case-by-case
basis.18 Scott moved the goal posts for review of deadly force used
against a particular class of suspects—those who attempt to flee police
detection, even in cases where the underlying offense is a minor or
nonviolent traffic infraction.19
This departure from the Court’s prior case-by-case analysis20 exposes
innocent bystanders to the dangers of police chases and has created a
dangerous precedent for trial courts.21 Though the full scope of Scott’s
influence on local police departments has not yet become apparent, local
police departments can develop more restrictive policies, especially
considering that “local community concerns can trump court rulings, a
phenomenon which does not always characterize the relationship between
court rulings and police practices.”22

15. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 n.3 (2014) (“In Scott, however, we declined to ‘lay
down a rule requiring the police to allow suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that
they put other people’s lives in danger,’ concluding that the Constitution ‘assuredly does not impose
this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness.’”). The Court also held that even if their conduct
was not reasonable, the officers would “still be entitled to summary judgment based on qualified
immunity.” Id. at 2023. A complete discussion of qualified immunity is outside the scope of this Note.
For an in depth discussion of Scott’s impact on the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, see
generally Mark R. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 Nev. L.J.
185 (2008); see also George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2013); id. at 849–50 (Trott, J.,
concurring in small part and disagreeing in large part).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) (“Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”).
17. See Garner v. Tennessee, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV.
18. Specifically, when the use of force is “necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–13; see infra notes 29–35 and accompanying text.
19. Scott, 550 U.S at 382 n.9 (“[Harris] committed only a minor traffic offense and, as far as the
police were aware, has no prior criminal record.”).
20. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. Lum & Fachner, supra note 7, at 6.
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Even before Scott, individuals attempting to sue state officers under
§ 1983 faced the challenging burden of proving that the officer’s actions
were unreasonable and violated a “clearly established” constitutional
principle at the time of the incident.23 Scott’s presumption of
reasonableness makes this burden more difficult to satisfy. It is now
nearly impossible for a plaintiff injured by an officer’s use of force to
terminate a pursuit to establish that the officer’s conduct was
unreasonable—let alone that it violated a “clearly established”
constitutional principle. A better rule would consider whether an
officer’s conduct violated clearly established state or local guidelines to
determine whether an officer’s conduct was, in fact, reasonable. Such a
rule would empower state and local governments to protect the safety of
their citizens and police officers from the dangers of unreasonable police
chases by enacting policies and legislation to clarify when the use of
excessive force to terminate a police pursuit would be considered
reasonable.24
This Note analyzes Scott’s problematic holding and suggests a
statutory guide for local governments to restrict the nearly boundless
scope of police authority to use deadly force to terminate high-speed
pursuits. Part I discusses leading excessive force case law prior to Scott and
the Supreme Court’s departure from this precedent. Part II discusses three
problems that undermine Scott’s reasonableness analysis, including its
troubling impact on lower courts. Part III encourages local governments
to adopt statutes that clearly define when an officer’s conduct is not
reasonable, and suggests unique guidelines for urban and rural areas.

I. SCOTT Created a Per Se Rule That Ignores Court Precedent
Prior to Scott, the Court considered a number of important factors
to determine whether an officer’s use of force to stop a fleeing suspect
was reasonable. In the landmark case Tennessee v. Garner, for example,
the Court held that an officer’s use of deadly force to stop a fleeing
suspect was unreasonable because the suspect was unarmed and posed
no lasting threat to the public.25 The Court applied the Garner analysis
for more than twenty years, always interpreting it to require a case-bycase reasonableness determination.26 Scott departed from this precedent
and adopted a per se rule that the use of a ramming technique to
terminate a police pursuit is always reasonable, almost regardless of the

23. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800, 817 (1982); see
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 21 (1985).
26. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“[Garner’s] proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .”).

M - Buchwalter_13 (N. Teixeira).doc (Do Not Delete)

1670

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/17/2014 5:01 PM

[Vol. 65:1665

facts of the particular chase.27 When the Court reviewed the video of
Scott’s chase, it applied this per se rule rather than the Garner case-bycase reasonableness test that the district and appellate courts had
previously applied.28 This Part argues that the Court should not have
adopted this presumption.
A. SCOTT Abandoned the Court’s Case-by-Case Precedence

Scott’s holding was a dramatic departure from two prior cases that
together set a clear and workable standard for deadly force litigation.
The facts of Garner and Graham v. Connor are distinct from the facts in
Scott because neither involved a high-speed police pursuit. However,
both cases relied on an analysis of the facts of a particular case to guide
the ultimate determination of whether the officer’s conduct was
reasonable; this case-by-case analysis can and should be applied to any
deadly force case.
Garner involved an unarmed suspect who was shot and killed by an
officer while the suspect fled the scene.29 The Court held that the officer
acted unreasonably because deadly force can only be used if it is
“necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury.”30 The Court determined that the officer’s use of deadly
force was not reasonable because, even if the act was necessary to
prevent escape, the unarmed suspect did not pose significant threat.31
The Court reasoned that use of deadly force constitutes a seizure subject
to the Fourth Amendment and that the nature of the intrusion should be
balanced against the governmental interests based on the totality of the
circumstances.32 Although the State has a significant interest in
apprehending fleeing suspects, this alone does not justify use of deadly
force because “[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is
unmatched.”33 By weighing the officer’s conduct against the specific
suspect’s conduct, Garner established a case-by-case analysis for deadly

27. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”).
28. See Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005).
29. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 11 (“A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”).
32. Id. at 7–9.
33. Id. at 9.
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force litigation34 and set a high bar to justify the use of deadly force
because “unmatched” intrusion “should trigger special consideration.”35
The next significant excessive force case, Graham v. Connor,
involved a § 1983 claim against an officer who refused to allow a suspect
detained on the side of the road to treat his diabetic reaction.36 The
Court held that an officer’s alleged use of force is properly analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard.37
The Court clarified that this reasonableness test “requires careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue . . . and whether [the suspect] is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”38 In so holding,
Graham reaffirmed Garner and solidified the standard for deadly force,
upon which courts relied until Scott.
Neither Garner nor Graham contemplated a per se rule justifying
the use of deadly force against suspects that disregarded the specific facts
at issue. If Scott had relied on Garner and Graham, the Court could have
properly found that Officer Scott’s conduct was unreasonable.39 As in
Garner, the deadly force in Scott was an unmatched intrusion, the police
pursuit was not necessary to prevent escape,40 and the chase could have
added danger to the public.41 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
refused to consider the Garner factors, however, and re-framed the
precedent by noting that “Garner did not establish a magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions
constitute ‘deadly force.’ Garner was simply an application of the Fourth
Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test to the use of a particular type of
force in a particular situation.”42 Put differently, Justice Scalia essentially

34. Id. at 8 (“To determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
35. Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies and Garner Jury
Instructions?, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 45, 57 (2007).
36. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989). As a result of not treating the diabetic reaction,
Graham passed out and suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured
right shoulder. Id. at 390.
37. Id. at 388.
38. Id. at 396.
39. Prior to Scott, many observers thought that Garner “provided a reliable backdrop against
which to evaluate such police pursuit tactics as ramming . . . [but] the contours of reasonableness
changed significantly after the decision in Scott.” Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, Police
Pursuits After Scott v. Harris: Far from Ideal?, Ideas in Am. Policing (Police Foundation, D.C.), June
2008, at 4, available at http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/g/files/g798246/f/Alpert%
20(2008)%
20%
20Police%
20Pursuits.pdf.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.A.
42. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (citation omitted). This holding applies regardless of
the severity of the underlying crime and whether the pursuit or use of force could add danger to the
public. Id. at 386. (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed chase that
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isolated police pursuits from other excessive force cases and applied a
brand new—much broader—Fourth Amendment standard that presumes
reasonableness. Though Garner and Graham remain good law, Scott
essentially rendered their holdings moot when applied to vehicle
pursuits.43
Of course, the Court can apply unique standards for distinct
situations. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, to pick one
example, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment’s balance of
reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than
in the interior,”44 and thereby modified Fourth Amendment rights in
these specific situations. Scott’s per se rule was wrongly decided,
however, because it pulls Fourth Amendment protections out of the
reach of an entire class of suspects,45 but does not satisfy any particular
government interests. In situations occurring along the U.S. border, as in
Montoya de Hernandez, the government arguably has an interest in
reducing Fourth Amendment protections.46 Any supposed government
interest contemplated by Scott’s standard is not being accomplished,
however, because police pursuits often add danger to the public, and
officers can use other means to catch and apprehend criminals.47
Applying this per se rule to the facts of Scott, Justice Scalia focused
primarily on the threat to the public that Officer Scott sought to
eliminate.48 But instead of adopting a Garner-esque case-specific analysis,
Justice Scalia concluded flatly that a police officer’s “attempt to terminate
a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places
the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”49 Despite
purporting to consider the danger to public safety, Justice Scalia did not
contemplate the risk to the public added by the officer’s decision to pursue
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”).
43. Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1119, 1136–37
(2008) (“[T]he Court not only emasculated Garner, but in the same paragraph—without comment or
analysis—implicitly dismissed the factors articulated in Graham as central to analyzing reasonableness.
In doing so, the Court reduced the Fourth Amendment regulation of reasonable force to its vaguest
form . . . .”); Blum, supra note 35, at 59 (“This reconstruction of Garner so as to diminish its general
applicability will prove detrimental to law enforcement agencies and to the communities they serve,
including many innocent bystanders who have no culpability at all.”).
44. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
45. In addition, there is a significant risk that Scott’s standard will be applied to other types of
excessive force rather than just to police pursuits, given that there is a dearth of Supreme Court
guidance on excessive force more generally. See Harmon, supra note 43, at 1119–20, 1127.
46. Due to the interest in preventing smuggling and terrorism, “the Fourth Amendment balance
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual are also struck much
more favorably to the Government at the border.” Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
47. See infra Part II.A.
48. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
49. Id. at 386. For a detailed description of such available tactics, see infra Part II.B.
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the chase, as would typically be required under a Garner analysis.50 In fact,
the suspect could likely have been safely apprehended later using widely
available police tactics, such as GPS tracking. Though perhaps slightly
overstated, this rule essentially authorizes “summary execution of anyone
who flees from the police in a motor vehicle” and yet does nothing to
reduce the number of innocent bystanders, police officers, and suspects
who are killed in police pursuits each year.51 While the Court’s broad
reasonableness standard might reduce the potential for danger in a
vacuum, a realistic review of police pursuits indicates that complete
deference to officers’ decisions to use deadly force will do little to reduce
the prevalence of pursuits and could add unnecessary danger.52
Justice Scalia’s approach established the per se rule53 that the use of
ramming techniques—which could cause serious injury or death—is always
reasonable to terminate a vehicle pursuit,54 rejecting the previouslyaccepted application of Garner to deadly force cases.55 If the Court had
applied Garner, Officer Scott’s actions may have been deemed
unreasonable given that the Eleventh Circuit already determined that
Harris’ conduct was not dangerous and rejected the argument that Harris’
attempt to flee necessitated excessive force.56 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that “Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns
and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns.”57 In
reviewing the videotape, though, the Court overruled this factual finding
and determined that when the suspect created the risk, use of force to
end a police chase was presumptively reasonable regardless of the
consequences.58
Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights that a reasonable juror could have
determined that Harris did not create a dangerous condition that justified
the use of deadly force. After viewing the videotape, for example, Justice

50. Harmon, supra note 43, at 1160 n.187.
51. Blum, supra note 35, at 55.
52. Alpert & Smith, supra note 39, at 4; Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law:
Police and the Excessive Use of Force 11 (1994) (noting that “fleeing motorists become prime
candidates for painful lessons at the ends of police nightsticks”).
53. Scott, 550 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the Court insofar as it
articulates a per se rule.”); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J.,
concurring) (“For all of its talk of a balancing test, the Harris court has, in effect, established a per se
rule . . . .”).
54. Harmon, supra note 43, at 1139 n.98 (“The Court’s conclusion . . . likely represents something
very close to a per se rule.”).
55. Id. at 1135.
56. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga, 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550
U.S. 372 (2007).
57. Id.
58. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81.
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Stevens himself concluded that the pursuit was not necessarily dangerous59
and that abandonment of the chase may have best served public safety.60
Even if a jury deemed Harris’ conduct dangerous, Justice Stevens
emphasized that it was not “a capital offense, or even an offense that
justified the use of deadly force rather than abandonment of the chase.”61
Thus, in finding Scott’s use of excessive force reasonable, the Court’s
rule “fl[ies] in the face of the flexible and case-by-case ‘reasonableness’
approach applied in Garner and Graham.”62 Scott makes it more difficult
for suspect-plaintiffs in § 1983 cases to survive summary judgment, but
the broad reasonableness standard now threatens to prevent plaintiffs
from recovery at all stages of litigation, as courts have recently used Scott
to decline to read “deadly force” jury instructions at trial.63
Scott’s presumption has become even more entrenched with the
Supreme Court’s 2014 Plumhoff decision, which concerned another
§ 1983 high-speed pursuit case.64 Plumhoff involved an excessive force
case brought by the family of Donald Rickard, who was killed—along
with a passenger—when police officers fired fifteen shots into his vehicle
after a prolonged police pursuit.65 As in Scott, the Justices watched a
video of the pursuit at oral argument and determined that the officer’s
conduct was reasonable.66 At oral arguments, the Court spent much of its
time lecturing the plaintiff’s attorney that, in order to prevail, he would
need to show that it is “clearly established . . . that police cannot shoot to
kill when a car is moving.”67 The Court ultimately concluded—after mere
references to Garner and Graham—that “it is beyond serious dispute
that Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here, as in
Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that
risk.”68

59. Id. at 392 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“At no point during the chase did respondent pull into the
opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of him . . . and, on most of those occasions, used his turn
signal . . . . [T]he video does not reveal any incidents that could even be remotely characterized as
‘close calls.’”).
60. Id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“What would have happened if the police had decided to
abandon the chase? We now know that they could have apprehended respondent later because they
had his license plate number.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 396.
63. See, e.g., Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 307, 309 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it was
reasonable for the lower court to remove “deadly force” jury instructions because under Scott, “it was
inappropriate to instruct the jury on the Garner factors in cases with dissimilar facts”).
64. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–23 (2014).
65. Id.
66. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: To Decide, or Not, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 4, 2014,
1:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-analysis-to-decide-or-not.
67. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).
68. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022.
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This Note argues that the Court has misapplied the “clearly
established” standard in order to create a bright line rule that has proven
to be problematic in practice. The question should not be whether officer
conduct violated clearly established law in a vacuum, but rather whether
the conduct violated clearly established law based on the facts of the
particular case. Even if firing shots at a moving vehicle does not necessarily
violate clearly established law, for example, firing fifteen shots to end a
police pursuit might violate clearly established law if the conduct put
innocent bystanders at risk or if the officer could have used less lethal
means to apprehend the suspect. To make this fact-specific determination,
courts should consider not only whether the officer’s conduct violated
clearly established Supreme Court rulings, but also whether the conduct
expressly violated state and local policies regulating excessive force.
B. The Supreme Court Expanded Its Authority by Rejecting
Factual Findings of Lower Courts

Scott also stands for the rule that when video of a police pursuit
exists, the Court can review this video itself rather than rely on the
district court’s factual findings.69 Typically, the Court must defer to the
district courts for questions of fact, though it can review these findings
for clear error.70 In reviewing issues of fact, the Court should “give due
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local
law enforcement officers.”71 Additionally, even though he did not do so in
Scott, Justice Scalia acknowledged that in a summary judgment motion,
“facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”72 Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit determined that
Harris’ conduct did not, by itself, create a public danger that justified the
use of deadly force.73 Thus, if the Court deferred to local judges and
weighed the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Scott would be an open-and-shut denial of summary judgment.
In reviewing the video, however, the Court took the then-unusual
step of relying on its own senses to make factual determinations to justify
a legal rule, echoing Justice Stewart’s famous line “I know [obscenity]

69. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (“The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version
of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”).
70. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001).
71. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
72. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
73. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550
U.S. 372 (2007) (“As noted by the district court judge, taking the facts from the non-movant’s
viewpoint, Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically
used his indicators for turns.”).
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when I see it.”74 If the Court had relied on the conclusions of local judges
and weighed the evidence in the light most favorable to Harris, the result
likely would have been different. Indeed, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
each acknowledged that watching the video footage of the car chase
affected their determination of the case.75
After reviewing the videotape, the Court erred in holding that “no
reasonable jury” could find that Harris’ driving was not per se dangerous.
In fact, one Supreme Court Justice, three Appellate Court Judges, and
the District Court Judge who presided over the case each found that
Harris’ conduct was not inherently dangerous and did not justify the use of
deadly force.76 Moreover, studies indicate that different communities—
which could form the jury pool for a case like Scott—have different
conceptions of what constitutes dangerous driving and when police force is
reasonable.77 After watching the video, for example, most respondents to
one study reported that they considered Harris’ driving to be dangerous,
but African Americans and low-income workers “tended to perceive less
danger in Harris’ flight, to attribute more responsibility to the police for
creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use of
deadly force to end the chase.”78
The Court’s review of the video therefore raises two central concerns.
First, it forces the Court to attempt to determine what a reasonable jury
could decide based not on what an actual jury could decide, but based on
the values of the nine Justices.79 By neglecting the views of certain subcommunities that might be sympathetic to the suspect and critical of the
officer, the Court essentially endorsed the potential for denying a victim
the right to a jury of her peers.80 Second, reviewing the video creates the
potential for an inequitable application of justice; the presence or absence
of a video should not contribute to the determination of a defendant’s guilt

74. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are you Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 903 n.211 (2009) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
75. Scott, 550 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]atching the video footage of the car chase made
a difference to my own view of the case.”); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The video footage of the car
chase . . . demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not transgress Fourth Amendment limitations.”).
76. Id. at 392 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Harris, 433 F.3d at 815–16.
77. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 864–65.
78. Id. at 841.
79. See id. at 853 (“The facts highlighted by Justice Scalia’s analysis . . . all relate to moral (and
legal) attributions of blame. Perceptions of those facts . . . are likely to be motivated by extrinsic moral
evaluations of the putatively blameworthy actors—Harris and the police.”).
80. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. This system also undermines the legitimacy of the jury system—in
both criminal and civil courts—because it prevents jurors from certain backgrounds from the exercising
an opportunity to serve on a jury. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 887 (“[O]rdering that the case be decided
summarily based on the video was wrong precisely because doing so denied a dissenting group of citizens
the respect they were owed, and hence denied the law the legitimacy it needs, when the law adopts a view
of the facts that divides citizens on social, cultural, and political lines.”).
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or innocence. Under Scott, an appellate court could find a defendant
guilty based on watching the video,81 but find the defendant not guilty in
the absence of a video by relying on the lower court’s factual findings.
In Morton v. Kirkwood, for example, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted
Scott to hold that “where an accurate video recording completely and
clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony becomes
incredible.”82 The court held further that Kirkwood, an officer who shot
the suspect-plaintiff Morton seven times after a vehicle pursuit, fell short
of this standard because rather than a video recording, he merely offered
“forensic evidence that [did] not so utterly discredit Morton’s testimony
that no reasonable jury could believe it.”83 Taken to its logical extreme,
this holding indicates that it could become even more difficult for a
suspect-plaintiff to succeed on a § 1983 claim if the police officer produces
video that undermines any aspect of the victim’s testimony.

II. SCOTT’s Reasonableness Analysis Ignored Important Factors
The Supreme Court can depart from its own precedent (here,
Garner and Graham) and create new rules with impunity.84 But with
Scott, the Court did not simply modify its excessive force analysis; it
completely rewrote the book on use of deadly force as applied to vehicle
pursuits. Even if, as Justice Scalia posits,85 Scott simply marks a change in
how the reasonableness test is applied, it ignores three central elements
that courts should consider when analyzing use of force applied to police
pursuits. First, the police pursuit added danger to the public. Second, the
Court did not consider police tools that indicate strongly that the officers
could have apprehended Harris safely if they had abandoned the chase.
Third, subsequent decisions indicate that Scott is unworkable and has led
to problematic holdings in the lower courts. The absence of these
considerations underscores Scott’s flawed reasoning.
A. The Pursuit Added Danger to the Public

Scott erred in neglecting the severity of Harris’ underlying offense
or the public safety risk added by pursuing—rather than abandoning—
the chase. Scott’s holding contravenes the purpose of most police

81. Or, as the case may be, selecting only the video that would be the most helpful to the
prosecution’s case. In Scott, the Court’s opinion does not mention three other videotapes entered into the
record, which may have corroborated Harris’s version of the facts. Alpert & Smith, supra note 39, at 11.
82. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013).
83. Id.
84. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the
respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an
inexorable command.”).
85. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner was simply an application of the Fourth
Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test.”).

M - Buchwalter_13 (N. Teixeira).doc (Do Not Delete)

1678

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/17/2014 5:01 PM

[Vol. 65:1665

department policies regarding high-speed pursuits.86 Indeed, according to
a survey of pursuit policies nationwide, the average policy “mandates
that an officer may initiate a high-speed pursuit only after the officer
concludes that the risk to the public by not apprehending the suspect
outweighs the dangers such a pursuit presents.”87
Georgia itself, where the pursuit at issue in Scott took place,
requires that an officer terminate a pursuit when “the immediate danger
to the public created by the pursuit is greater than the immediate or
potential danger to the public should the suspect remain at large.”88
Georgia police departments also mandate that officers abandon a pursuit
“when the violator’s identity has been established to the point that later
apprehension can be accomplished without danger to the public.”89
Under Georgia’s guidelines, Scott’s conduct was unreasonable because
Harris posed no danger to the public before the pursuit, did not add
significant risk during the pursuit, and police could have apprehended
him safely after the pursuit by tracking his license plate number (among
other tactics). Courts should consider these state and local guidelines in
their interpretation of whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable or
violated clearly established law.
Moreover, most policies forbid pursuits when the underlying offence
is a nonviolent misdemeanor or a traffic violation.90 In Scott, the officers
originally recorded Harris driving seventy-three miles per hour in a fiftyfive miles per hour zone, and Harris had no warrants out for his arrest.91
Because most police departments would not condone the type of
protracted pursuit displayed in Scott, the officer’s conduct could not have
been presumptively reasonable and would have been contrary to clearly
established law in light of these policies.92
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the pursuit likely
increased the risk of public danger.93 A 1997 analysis of police pursuit
policies nationwide acknowledged that “increasing the number of vehicles
involved in police pursuits increased the likelihood of apprehension, but
86. See Brief for the National Police Accountability Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at *5, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05–1631), 2007 WL 128585 [hereinafter Brief for the
National Police Accountability Project].
87. Id. at *6.
88. Brief for the Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at *33, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05–1631), 2006 WL 3693417.
89. Id.
90. Brief for the National Police Accountability Project, supra note 86, at *6.
91. Scott, 550 U.S. at 390; Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 844.
92. See Brief for the National Police Accountability Project, supra note 86, at *6; Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985) (“The fact is that a majority of police departments in this country
have forbidden the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects.”).
93. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 894 (“When police decide to initiate a high-speed chase—and
to persist in it until they manage to force the suspect to lose control of his vehicle and crash—they
create immense risk for members of the public generally.”).
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also the chance of accidents, injuries, and property damage.”94 Statistics
indicate that an alarming number of civilians and innocent bystanders are
killed as a result of police pursuits.95 Of the 424 people killed in police
pursuits in 2007 alone, for example, 119 (twenty-eight percent) were
innocent civilians, compared to nine (two percent) who were police
officers, and 296 (seventy percent) who were occupants of the chased
vehicle.96 If the officers had temporarily abandoned the pursuit and
apprehended Harris later, they would not have created an added danger
to the public or risked contributing to this troubling statistic.
There is no dispute that pursuit policies must give some deference to
officers who “are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”97 But allowing
too much deference can cause unnecessary risk to suspects and innocent
bystanders because these tense situations often involve an officer who
has been in “an adrenaline-driven chase, and who is highly excited or
extremely angry at the suspect.”98 Thus, by virtue of having challenged
police authority by attempting to flee, “fleeing motorists become prime
candidates for painful lessons at the ends of police nightsticks,”99 or, as
the case may be, police vehicles.
Retributive force, a potential byproduct of these adrenaline-laden
pursuits, raises additional Fourth Amendment concerns.100 Although it is
important to give some deference to officers in the line of duty, involved
parties often disagree about what constitutes excessive force.101 Thus,
whatever deference is given to officers should be accompanied by policies
that protect the public and state clearly what conduct is considered
reasonable. If courts considered state and local policies to guide their
reasonableness determinations, then officers would be more likely to
abide by these regulations and err on the side of caution because of their
knowledge that the use of force could trigger tort liability.

94. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Pursuit: Policies and Training, National Institute of Justice,
May 1997, at 2, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164831.pdf.
95. Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit, supra note 6, at 51–52.
96. Id.
97. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
98. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Pursuits and the Use of Force: Recognizing and Managing
“The Pucker Factor”—A Research Note, 14 Just. Q. 371, 383 (1997).
99. Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 52, at 11.
100. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (noting in a search consent case that use
of police brutality to obtain a confession is unconstitutional).
101. Alpert et al., supra note 98, at 381. In one report, suspects reported the use of force in fiftyseven percent of criminal apprehensions, while in another report, only forty-seven percent of officer
supervisors reported the use of force. Id. Force was officially reported in only seventeen percent of
these apprehensions. Id.
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B. Harris Could Have Been Apprehended if the Chase Had Been
Abandoned
In today’s world, evading police officers who have information about
the suspect’s car, license plate number, location, and potential destinations
would require criminal sophistication on par with Hollywood heist films.102
To apprehend suspects safely without a high-speed chase, police officers
employ traditional tactics—including license plate tracking and helicopter
detection103—or newly available technological methods104 to prevent
danger and catch the suspect without unnecessarily endangering the
public.
Another of Scott’s central weaknesses is that it has a short half-life
because what society considers reasonable must depend partially on the
resources available to police officers. Police technology has advanced
dramatically since the days of Dragnet105 and Magnum, P.I.,106 and the
Court should not identify a per se rule for police pursuits given that
reasonableness factors are ever-changing in the face of new technology.
Instead of taking this into account, the Court ignored technological
advances and found that Scott’s conduct was reasonable due partially to
the necessity of preventing Harris from escaping.107 In reality, newly
available technology likely could have enabled the police to apprehend
Scott later.
Paul D. Shultz, the Chief of Police for Lafayette, Colorado, has stated
that new technological methods, including GPS systems, “are reducing the
need for police pursuits. This technology enables officers to apprehend a
dangerous suspect at a later date when the safety of the community can be
maximized.”108 In addition to GPS technology, Chief Shultz lauded
automatic license plate recognition technology, which permits license
plate numbers to be automatically synthesized using optical character
recognition to glean additional information about the suspect—including
name and address—so that the officers can temporarily suspend the
search and make a safe arrest later.109 Furthermore, high-tech radios
enable officers to share photographs and video footage of the suspect

102. See, e.g., Ocean’s Eleven (Warner Bros. 2001).
103. See Ed Grabianowski, How Police Chases Work, How Stuff Works,
http://people.howstuffworks.com/police-chase.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) (explaining traditional
methods used to end police pursuits).
104. See Paul D. Shultz, The Future is Here: Technology in Police Departments, Police Chief
Magazine,
June
2008,
available
at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/
index.cfm?article_id=1527&fuseaction=display&issue_id=62008 (describing modern technologies that
could help to reduce the danger of police pursuits); see also infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
105. Dragnet (NBC television broadcast 1951–59).
106. Magnum, P.I. (CBS television broadcast 1980–88).
107. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 370, 385 (2007).
108. Shultz, supra note 104 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
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and share license plate numbers “across thousands of miles in minutes or
even seconds.”110 These modern tools to ameliorate the dangers of police
pursuits are supported by the establishment of an international database
with information and statistics about pursuit suspects.111
Police technology is sure to develop even further in the coming
years. Such technology will increase the likelihood of safe apprehension
in lieu of dangerous police chases. GPS bullets, for example, “allow
officers to shoot tracking devices onto other vehicles to be monitored
remotely and are already reportedly in use in four states” at little to no
danger to the suspect.112 The California Peace Officer’s Association has
expressed interest in High Speed Avoidance Laser Technology, which
would allow officers to reduce the speed of a fleeing suspect’s car by
firing a laser at the engine.113 Additionally, one company developed a
microwave gun that would enable police officers to overload the fleeing
suspect’s car’s electrical system and stop the engine.114
Current technologies, in addition to these promising experimental
technologies, indicate that suspension of police pursuits in favor of safe
apprehension of suspects without added public danger will only become
more viable in the coming years.115 As such use grows more common, Jay
Stanley of the American Civil Liberties Union predicts that individuals
“being chased by the police [will] realize that they have no hope of
escape unless they somehow get that device off of their car.”116 Use of
such technology would reduce the necessity for high-speed pursuits,
meaning that—absent Scott—officers would need to satisfy a high bar to
properly use force.

110. Id.
111. See Lum & Fachner, supra note 7, at 1 (“The goal of this project was to create an internetbased, interactive computerized reporting system by which police agencies could submit and manage
reports of vehicular pursuits and in turn, access the full database for statistical reports compiled from
all pursuits recorded in the database.”). Programs like COMPSTAT already perform a similar
function on a more local level by helping “precincts and boroughs share knowledge with each other.”
Id. at 12.
112. Joshua Rhett Miller, The Cop of the Future: Will Crooks Have a Chance Against Smart
Bullets, Crowd-Stun Cannons and Eyes Everywhere?, FoxNews.com (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/01/27/cop-future-will-crooks-have-chance-against-smart-bulletscrowd-stun-cannons-and.
113. Jessica Garrison, High-Tech HALT to Chases, L.A. Times, (May 29, 2000),
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/29/local/me-35280.
114. Grabianowski, supra note 103.
115. Civil liberties advocates have lauded such technologies as “less lethal” than traditional
methods of detection, and note that if used properly, they will not open a Pandora’s box of new
privacy concerns. See Miller, supra note 112.
116. Id.
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C. SCOTT Set a Dangerous Precedent for Lower Courts
The potential for the police to apprehend a suspect safely in the
absence of force points toward a single conclusion that weighs strongly in
favor of abandoning Scott: it created a dangerous precedent, which,
when applied to other circumstances, increases the danger of pursuits to
the public. Since Scott, district and appellate courts have grappled with
the presumptive reasonableness standard for use of excessive force and
have even extended the broad reasonableness standard to more
dangerous situations.117
Scott’s strain on lower courts is best illustrated by the Eleventh
Circuit’s Beshers v. Harrison decision.118 The facts of Beshers are
remarkably similar to the facts of Scott. Beshers’ son filed a § 1983 claim
after a police officer used deadly force to end a high-speed police pursuit,
killing Beshers.119 Despite his finding that the suspect’s conduct was not
“particularly heinous,” and certainly did not warrant death, Judge
Presnell’s concurrence stated that Scott compelled him “to conclude that,
as a matter of law, [Officer] Harrison had the right to end the chase by
killing Beshers.”120 Judge Presnell explained that his decision and Scott’s
precedent troubled him because it ignores the danger to the suspect.
“For all of its talk of a balancing test, the [Scott] court has, in effect,
established a per se rule: Unless the chase occurs below the speed limit
on a deserted highway, the use of deadly force to end a motor vehicle
pursuit is always a reasonable seizure.”121 In other words, Judge Presnell
lamented Scott’s implication that officers could kill a suspect to end
nearly any police pursuit.
Since Beshers, lower courts have found that use of force was not
reasonable only when the facts were markedly distinct from Scott, like
when officers terminated a pursuit by shooting the suspect multiple
times.122 But the Plumhoff decision, which applied Scott’s reasonableness
presumption even where the suspect and his passenger were killed after

117. See, e.g., Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that an officer’s use of
deadly force on suspect on a motorcycle was objectively reasonable).
118. 495 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
119. Id. at 1263; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011).
120. Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1271–72 (Presnell, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Zion v. Nassan, No. 12–3193, 2014 WL 323373, at *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2014) (“[I]t
may be reasonable for an officer to bump a car off the road to stop a reckless driver who is placing
others in peril, while simultaneously unreasonable to shoot directly at a driver who is coming toward
an officer when the officer has the opportunity to move out of the way.”); Lyte v. Bexar Cnty., Tex.,
560 F.3d 404, 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the officer’s conduct was not reasonable when he
fired his weapon through the suspect’s rear window, killing a passenger). This is not always the case;
the Tenth Circuit held, for example, that an officer’s use of deadly force—shooting the suspect in the
back of the head to end the pursuit—was reasonable. Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1189–90
(10th Cir. 2010).
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officers fired fifteen shots into the car, indicates that even use of deadly
force by gunfire is now considered reasonable.123
Most cases involving the use of force to terminate a simple vehicle
pursuit have resolved in favor of the officer, which supports the contention
that these cases are no longer reviewed based on the jury’s determination
of the facts, but based on Scott’s presumption favoring summary
judgment.124 This was one of the results that Judge Presnell criticized in
Beshers: under the balancing test, “a jury ought to be deciding whether
the risk posed by the fleeing suspect is too minimal, or the suspected
crime too minor, to make killing him a reasonable way to halt the chase,”
but due to Scott’s precedent, “that decision has been taken away from
the jury where, as here, the fleeing suspect has endangered others.”125 A
more suitable test would apply the Court’s deadly force analysis not
based on the type of weapon used—police firearm or police car—but on
the likelihood that the use of force would kill or seriously injure the
pursued suspect, the risk of harm to the public, and whether local policies
condone the use of force in the given situation.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pasco v. Knoblauch126 highlights the
powerful impact of the presumptive reasonableness standard because the
Court decided Scott after the district court denied Officer Knoblauch’s
motion for summary judgment. Pasco involved a police chase in which the
suspect was killed as a result of injuries incurred after police used a
ramming technique to terminate a pursuit.127 The suspect had been driving
over ninety miles per hour in a rural area to evade police detection.128 The
officer conceded that the chase did not directly threaten pedestrians or
motorists and that Pasco slowed down toward the end of the pursuit, but
argued that the ramming technique used to run the suspect’s car off the
road was still reasonable.129 Before Scott, the district court relied on
Garner to hold that the officer “violated clear Fourth Amendment law
because [he] ‘was acting contrary to police department protocol’ when he
bumped Pasco off the road.”130 The Fifth Circuit reversed, citing the
newly decided Scott decision to hold that the officer’s ramming
technique was permissible because “it was reasonable for the officer to
choose to end the chase in light of the relative culpability of those at
risk.”131 Pasco underscores the sea change in excessive force litigation
123. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022–23(2014).
124. See supra Part I.A; see also Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1263; Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 580–
81 (5th Cir. 2009).
125. Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1272 (Presnell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
126. 566 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 574.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 579.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 581.
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and indicates that some officers may interpret Scott to permit the use of
force even when it violates the officer’s own department protocol and
will not reduce the risk of danger to the public.
Scott’s broad application does not end there. Some circuits have
approved of the use of force when the suspect’s significant injury or death
is even more assured. In Abney v. Coe, for example, the Fourth Circuit
expanded Scott’s reach to apply to excessive force used against suspects on
motorcycles.132 This is particularly troubling given that motorcycles
provide very little protection; a police officer’s ramming technique nearly
guarantees the suspect’s death. The court wrote, however, that “the fact
that Abney was driving a motorcycle, rather than a car, does not require
a different result since the probability that a motorist will be harmed by a
Precision Intervention Technique is high in either circumstance.”133 The
Fourth Circuit held that the officer’s conduct was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment based on Scott’s presumptive reasonableness
standard, even though Scott did not contemplate use of deadly force for
suspects who were fleeing on motorcycles.
Thus, in addition to applying too broadly in deadly force cases
involving vehicles, Scott’s extension to motorcycles creates confusion
regarding how the presumptive reasonableness standard should be
applied in analogous circumstances that could create an even greater risk
of death or serious injury to the suspect.134 For this reason, a case-by-case
standard for police pursuit excessive force claims is preferable, and courts
should defer to local policies and guidelines—taking into account the
unique characteristics of the city or state—to determine reasonableness.

III. Public Policy Favors Circumventing SCOTT
Given the problems inherent in Scott, a suitable solution would
consider the potential danger that the police pursuit adds to the public,
the ability for the officers to safely catch and apprehend the suspect later,
and the workability of a new rule. To accomplish this, the Court would
need to overrule Scott’s presumptive reasonableness standard and reestablish the case-by-case reasonableness analysis that the Court
approved in Garner and Graham.135 But overruling an eight-to-one
132. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that an officer’s use of deadly
force on suspect on motorcycle was objectively reasonable).
133. Id. at 418. Some courts have distinguished Scott in § 1983 claims involving motorcycles. See
Walker v. Davis, 649 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the officer’s conduct unreasonable because
the suspect’s motorcycle did not pose an immediate threat to anyone).
134. Though not the focus of this Note, Scott’s disdain for suspects who flee from police officers
has led to restrictions for criminal defendants outside of the § 1983 context. See Terranova v. New
York, 676 F.3d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it was reasonable for the lower court to remove
“deadly force” jury instructions because under Scott, “it was inappropriate to instruct the jury on the
Garner factors in cases with dissimilar facts”).
135. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
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precedent—even one as flawed as Scott—is not likely, as became clear in
Plumhoff.136 As a result, the onus falls on state and local governments to
craft guidelines to clarify when the use of force is considered reasonable.
Even if courts do not take state and local guidelines under consideration,
establishing clear policies and training procedures could still reduce the
prevalence of dangerous police pursuits.137
Any solution to this problem must also address Justice Scalia’s
concern regarding the risk of creating the perverse incentive for suspects
to evade police officers.138 Of course, any new rule would not be
workable if it was interpreted as condoning or promoting evasion of
police officers. But this would not result from the rules proposed by this
Note. In fact, by strengthening police tactics to apprehend the suspect
after pursuit, suspects will know that any attempt to evade police
detection would be futile result in a more significant punishment when
the suspect was inevitably apprehended.
Local governments must take it upon themselves to determine the
circumstances in which it would be reasonable to terminate any pursuit,
especially considering that “reasonableness is judged against the backdrop
of the law at the time of the conduct.”139 If the pursuit is triggered by a
nonviolent infraction and the police conduct would add danger to the
public, for example, the officer’s use of potentially deadly force would be
unreasonable. If a violent crime involving significant risk to others
triggered the pursuit, on the other hand, then an officer’s conduct
terminating the pursuit would still be presumptively reasonable. Given
that the danger to the public will differ based on the specific jurisdiction,
local governments could establish different rules depending on their size,

136. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–24 (2014) (holding in a nine-to-zero decision
that use of force to terminate a police pursuit is presumptively reasonable).
137. To be clear, federal courts are under no obligation to consider local preferences when
drawing their reasonableness determinations. Federal courts must defer, however, to state courts on
questions of substantive law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Courts frequently
defer to state preferences on issues that could be applied differently depending on local values. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (ruling that federal courts should defer to state
determinations in habeas proceedings). Indeed, Justice Brandeis famously hailed the status of states as
laboratories of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). This Note argues that even in the absence of a federal obligation, taking such local
preferences into account would mark a meaningful improvement in the Court’s excessive force
jurisprudence because it is a common sense way to determine how a reasonable police officer in those
circumstances would act.
138. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) (“[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the
police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other
people’s lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create . . . .”).
139. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). It is important to note, however, that local
government standards may not impact the Court’s reasonableness analysis. The Court has determined,
for example, that “qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that,
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she
confronted.” Id.
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resources, and level of congestion. This Part analyzes two potential rules:
one for urban areas, using the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”)
as an example, and the other for highways, using the California Highway
Patrol (“CHP”) as an example.
A. Urban Areas: San Francisco Example
Due to congestion and the presence of pedestrians and other
innocent bystanders, urban areas raise unique questions regarding the
utility of high-speed police pursuits. The SFPD’s pursuit policy should
guide other cities because its primary goal is the safety of city residents, it
forbids ramming as a technique to terminate a pursuit, and it urges that a
pursuit should be abandoned if it would add danger to the public.140 But
the SFPD’s pursuit policy was last revised in 1997—a decade before the
Court overhauled deadly force standards related to pursuits. Thus, given
the post-Scott potential for confusion regarding which techniques are
reasonable for officers to use in police chases, the SFPD (and other
cities) should revise its policy to specify exactly when an officer’s conduct
would be considered unreasonable.
The SFPD encourages officers to take “reasonable efforts to
apprehend fleeing violators,” but states that “if an emergency response or
pursuit would pose an unreasonable risk to persons or property, the
pursuit or emergency shall not be initiated.”141 Moreover, when “it
becomes apparent that the benefits of immediate apprehension are clearly
outweighed by an unreasonable danger to the officer or others, the pursuit
shall not be initiated or, if already in progress, shall be terminated.”142 The
policy encourages officers to consider a number of factors to determine
whether to pursue the fleeing suspect, including the seriousness of the
triggering crime, public safety, speed, volume of pedestrian and vehicular
traffic, and weather conditions.143
The SFPD policy primarily condones “following actions,” such as
boxing in, heading off, driving alongside, and channeling.144 Offensive
tactics are rarely used, and the policy specifies that officers “shall not
attempt to stop a vehicle by ramming it or forcing the vehicle off the
road.”145 Other offensive tactics, like roadblocks and “road spikes,” are
only approved in dire circumstances with heavy supervision.146

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

S.F. Police Dep’t, General Order 5.05: Response and Pursuit Driving IV.M.1 (Feb. 12, 1997).
Id. at I.B, I.C.
Id. at IV.B(2).
Id. at IV.B(3).
Id. at IV.M(1).

Id.
Id. at IV.M(2)–(3).
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The SFPD policy suggests that any ramming technique—like the
one employed by Officer Scott—would be unreasonable.147 It also
implies that an officer’s use of force would be unreasonable if the suspect
could have been safely apprehended later, if the triggering offense was a
minor violation, or if the pursuit created an added danger to the
public.148 But given Scott’s broad reasonableness standard, a lower court
would likely defer to the Supreme Court and condone an officer’s
conduct even in the absence of the factors set out in the SFPD policy.149
Thus, courts should consider state and local policies that state clearly what
officer conduct is reasonable, especially given the unique dangers created
by police pursuits in urban areas and the documented variety of public
opinion regarding dangerous driving and reasonable police force.150
Like the SFPD policy, urban policies should prohibit ramming
techniques or only condone running the suspect’s vehicle off the road to
terminate pursuits initiated by a violent triggering crime. At the most
permissive end of the spectrum, urban pursuit policies should only
permit ramming when there are no other cars or innocent bystanders in
sight. Thus, an officer’s use of force following a police pursuit would be
unreasonable if the triggering crime was nonviolent or minor, or if the
maneuver occurred in a congested area such that it added to the public
danger.
This Note does not suggest a policy that could help dangerous
criminals escape police detection. Consider a 2013 San Francisco police
pursuit that occurred after the suspect fired his gun from his vehicle early
in the morning.151 Although the pursuit ended in a crash that killed two
innocent bystanders,152 this pursuit would be considered reasonable
because the armed suspect continued to pose a significant risk to the
public until he was apprehended. If, on the other hand, the pursuit and
use of force were triggered by a nonviolent or minor violation, indicating
that the suspect did not pose a grave danger to the public, then the
officer’s conduct would have been unreasonable.153 An officer’s conduct

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
150. See Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 841 (noting that African Americans and low-income
individuals “tended to perceive less danger in Harris’ flight, to attribute more responsibility to the
police for creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use of deadly force to end
the chase”).
151. Jill Tucker, Driver Flees from SF Traffic Stop; 2 Die, S.F. Chron. (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Driver-flees-from-SF-traffic-stop-2-die-4159713.php.
152. Id.
153. The example of the high-speed pursuit that officers initiated because the suspect had a knife,
sending two innocent bystanders to the hospital, for example, should be considered unreasonable.
Michaelson, supra note 1.
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would also be considered unreasonable if she used unnecessarily risky
tactics to end the pursuit.154
B. Highways and Rural Areas: California Highway Patrol
Example
Outside of urban areas, police officers should have more leeway to
pursue a suspect because it is less likely that such pursuits will add danger
to the public, given that highways are typically free from pedestrians,
include fewer obstacles, and often span rural areas. As in an urban
pursuit, the local government’s pursuit policy should consider the
officer’s use of force reasonable if the pursuit was triggered by a violent
crime, the pursuit did not add danger to the public, and the suspect likely
could not have been apprehended later. For highway patrols, though,
these standards are likely to be applied differently than in an urban
context. Due to the lack of pedestrians on highways, for example, it is less
likely that the officer’s conduct will add danger to the public. Moreover,
due to the potential for very high speeds on highways and their frequent
connection to other states or even countries, it may be more difficult to
apprehend the suspect later if the highway patrol officer temporarily
suspends the chase. For this reason, an officer’s conduct would likely be
deemed reasonable more frequently than in an urban context.
California lawmakers have developed guidelines for when a CHP
officer may pursue a suspect in a high-speed chase.155 California Senate
Bill 719 requires police officers to undergo training for police pursuits,
keep detailed records of such pursuits, and “develop uniform, minimum
guidelines for adoption by [California] law enforcement agencies for
response to high-speed vehicle pursuits.”156 The Peace Officers Research
Association of California introduced Senate Bill 719—nicknamed
“Kristie’s Law”—after Kristina Priano was killed when a fifteen year-old
being chased by police officers collided with Kristie’s family’s minivan.157
Reviewing the prior law, which granted broad immunity to police officers
for deaths that resulted from high-speed police pursuits, a California
Court of Appeal urged the legislature to “seriously reconsider the
balance between public entity immunity and public safety. The balance
appears to have shifted too far toward immunity and left public safety, as

154. One officer, for example, drove more than one hundred miles per hour into incoming traffic, and “leapfrogged” other vehicles before killing an innocent motorist in a “fiery explosion.” Mark Maroney, DA: Cop
‘Leap-Frogged’
Other
Cars
at
101
mph,
The
Express
(Jan.
29,
2014),
http://www.lockhaven.com/page/content.detail/id/549268/DA--Cop--leap-frogged--other-cars-at-101-mph.html.
155. Cal. S. B. 719, Ch. 485 (2005).
156. Id. at B(4).
157. Laura Smith, Prianos File Suit over Death of Daughter, Chico News & Review (Jun. 27,
2002), http://www.newsreview.com/chico/prianos-file-suit-over-death-of-daughter/content?oid=9875.
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well as compensation for innocent victims, twisting in the wind.”158
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Kristie’s Law in 2005 and the
Legislature later codified it as California Vehicle Code section
17.004.7.159
The Bill’s stated goal is to protect the public against injury or death
by improving officer training and reducing the number of police
pursuits.160 The adopted code provision is weaker than the proposed bill.
Despite requiring certain minimum training standards for pursuits, for
example, the law states that as long as such training is provided, the
officer is “immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to
or death of any person” that the officer pursues.161 The law also clarifies
that its provisions “represent minimum policy standards and do not limit
an agency from adopting additional policy requirements,” but provides
no clear guidance for when an officer’s conduct would be considered
reasonable.162 Section 17004.7, as adopted, falls short in two important
respects. First, in stating that “[p]ursuit intervention tactics include, but are
not limited to, blocking, ramming, boxing, and roadblock procedures,”163
the law lacks sufficient specificity to constitute a clear guideline.
Additionally, in order to satisfy Fourth Amendment obligations when the
intrusiveness of deadly force is “unmatched,”164 a suitable law should
clearly state when the officer’s conduct would be considered unreasonable.
Still, courts can infer when CHP believes an officer’s conduct is
unreasonable based on the guidelines listed in section 17004.7. The code
specifies that CHP officers should be trained to consider many elements,
including when to initiate a pursuit, when to terminate a pursuit, and the
hazards the pursuit creates to uninvolved pedestrians and motorists.165
Any decision to initiate a pursuit, for example, should “address the
importance of protecting the public and balancing the known or
reasonably suspected offense, and the apparent need for immediate
capture against the risks to peace officers, innocent motorists, and others
to protect the public.”166 To determine whether to terminate the pursuit,
the CHP officer must consider a variety of factors, including the risk to
the public, the protection of the public “given the known or reasonably
suspected offense and apparent need for immediate capture,” traffic
safety and volume, and whether the suspect can be apprehended later.167
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Nguyen v. City of Westminster, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Cal. Veh. Code § 17004.7 (2007).
S. Bill 719 at (L)(5)(g)–(i).
Veh. § 17004.7(b)(1).
Id. § 17004.7(e).
Id. § 17004.7(c)(6).
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (2007).
See generally Veh. § 17004.7.
Id. § 17004.7(c)(1).
Id. § 17004.7(c)(9).

M - Buchwalter_13 (N. Teixeira).doc (Do Not Delete)

1690

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

8/17/2014 5:01 PM

[Vol. 65:1665

Despite the law’s drawbacks, courts should consider laws like
section 17004.7 rather than rely on Scott’s presumptive reasonableness
standard because such state and local policies represent what each
jurisdiction considers reasonable based on local customs and
characteristics. Scott and Plumhoff, however, essentially undermine code
provisions like section 17004.7 by setting a broad reasonableness
standard for officers who terminate police pursuits and by assuming that
the officer’s termination of a police pursuit is reasonable regardless of
the triggering violation, the danger to the public, or traffic conditions.168
Thus, given that Supreme Court precedent governs § 1983 claims, if
federal courts do not consider state and local guidelines when looking at
reasonableness and clearly established law, then victims of death or
serious injury will be precluded from bringing a civil claim even in the
most flagrant examples of unreasonable officer conduct.

Conclusion
Clearer local statutes that set sharp boundaries for when use of
deadly force is reasonable to terminate a police pursuit will not resolve
all questions of excessive force. Indeed, in the past four decades, federal
courts have consistently limited § 1983 claims and have granted qualified
immunity much more broadly. But outside of the context of § 1983,
courts are typically hesitant to set their own rules, and prefer to follow
the stated preferences of local governments (provided that they are
constitutional). The Court should consider such local guidelines rather
than blindly apply the per se rule that use of force is reasonable even
when it is likely to cause the suspect’s death. By following the guidelines
for local police pursuit statutes set forth in this Note, cities and states
nationwide can send the message that this “unmatched” invasion of
Fourth Amendment rights is itself unreasonable and unsustainable.

168. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).

